UKH

Is he now so unhinged that he doesn'rt see the consequences of going nuclear or am I missing something?

In reply to Bojo:

He hasnt launched them yet.

Overall he is in a difficult position. He thought that the invasion would be a walkover. Which wasnt an unreasonable view to take prior to them getting their arses kicked. The general consensus was it would be a pretty quick conventional victory with just a risk of it deteriorating into a insurgency.

The problem is unlike most of the other people who got it wrong he is the strongman in charge of those who made the bad call.  Thats never a good position to be in since all the cowed underlings start thinking they might have a chance at taking over. Hence the need to keep doubling down since the pension plan for toppled dictators tends to make the accountants smile at the saving.

In reply to Bojo: I don’t think he’s unhinged, more used to getting his own way through escalating menace, threats and bullying. This chimes with use of radio isotopes and nerve agents clearly intended to provide traceability to Russia so facilitating “implausible deniability” . So far this has served him well with dissidents and rogue oligarchs, but he’s bern surprised to find it hasn’t worked with sovereign states that the west is willing to supply with advanced weapons. He’s now thinking never mind just keep escalating and the west are bound to back down. 

In reply to Bojo:

being seen as unhinged helps propagate fear of what he might do as it makes him appear less predictable or limited.

I think he fosters this, like Trump

In reply to Bojo:

His army has issues, his navy isn't up to much and he's scared to use his planes.  The only weapons he has left are lots of pressganged troops, threats and nuclear weapons.

And given that much of the funding for conventional forces seems to have found its way into the bank accounts of oligarchs, how much of the budget for maintenance and upkeep of nuclear weapons do you think has been used for the stated purpose?

Yes, it would only take one weapon to be used to change the game; but I suspect much of the Russian nuclear arsenal isn't in a usable state.

There are sure to be some very discreet conversations happening amongst those whom Putin has made rich as to what the future might contain and what they might do to make sure it benefits them.

T.

I'm sure many are asking "what happens now?"

In reply to Bojo:

https://nitter.net/Gerashchenko_en/status/1572646103593385985#m

https://nitter.net/TheDeadDistrict/status/1572642253759201281#m

https://nitter.net/KyivIndependent/status/1572531586649960448#m

In reply to Bojo:

But what are the consequences of him using a tactical nuke?

The West cant nuke back as that ends in MAD.

The West cant deploy troops directly on the ground as it ends in MAD

We can supply more weapons/sanctions but that doesn’t change the defacto situation currently, so he hasn’t lost much and it plays to his home narrative of unit behind Russia against the evil west.

The madder he looks, and with apparently little prospect of him being deposed internally, the more likely the West will force Ukraine behind closed doors to negotiate.  If he starts to look sane we will continue to provide means to Ukraine to push back.

The worrying part is that he might actually do it, and I’m increasingly thinking he might.

In reply to Bojo:

What is more plausible and hence scary is the prospect of a targeted attack on a Ukrainian nuclear power station at a time when there are strong prevailing Easterly winds

In reply to kevin stephens:

Luckily the wind doesn't often travel east to west.  But I can see bombing a Ukrainian nuclear power station isn't likely to be seen in the same light by the west as a nuclear bomb but still worrying.

In reply to Bojo:

He is an old man, there is lots of speculation that he may be very ill. His last hurrah is failing.

He doesn't have much to loose really. 

In reply to mondite:

I think it was an unreasonable view to take for anyone who actually knew Ukrainians. It was always going to be a bitter, bloody war. 

In reply to Yanis Nayu:

First rule of war in Europe - don’t invade Russia.

The Russians appear to have identified Ukraine as a lot like Russia, then invaded it.

In reply to Yanis Nayu:

Not necessarily. Remember the 2014 invasion of Crimea and the green man operations elsewhere.  The Russians had succeed in their aims there with at best a low level conflict which handily prevented any chance of entry into Nato and also allowed some combat training for those soldiers on holiday.

Whilst the chances of a nasty insurgency was high (personally my bet was on this) I dont think anyone really predicted this result. Its telling all the kit initially supplied was light manportable stuff. All the fancy HIMARS and similar kit only got provided once it was clear the invasion was struggling and, importantly, the Russians were utterly failing in the air war. Those artillery pieces really should have been target practice.

The basic Russian plan wasnt that bad with the seizing of strategic assets especially the airport and launching a decapitation strike into Kyiv. Its just they failed to either gain complete air superiority meaning they couldnt get the reinforcements in by air and then the ground columns did, well who knows what they were doing, and so it all fell it to bits.

In reply to Dr.S at work:

Unless you are Mongols in which case wait for winter and then party on.

Or for that matter the Norse did a fairly good job of it.

In reply to mondite:

yeah, but they killed everybody 

Did they not become (or at least contribute to) the Russians?

In reply to Dr.S at work:

Not quite everyone since otherwise they wouldnt get tribute the next year. Their general approach tended more towards if you surrendered quickly then it was not an overly burdensome tribute but if you fought back then complete scorched earth to encourage the next town along to surrender quickly.

Yes. They are the "Rus" (well almost certainly which is about as good as you get from historians).

In reply to kevin stephens:

My understanding from nuclear power station friends is that they are designed to withstand those type of attacks. So not that easy anyway. 

In reply to Bojo:

Laurence Freedman has produced a well thought out analysis - 

https://samf.substack.com/p/going-nuclear?utm_medium=reader2

In reply to mondite and Yanis Nayu:

Interesting discussion.  

My view - I don't think the UK spent the last 8 years training the armed forces of Ukraine with the expectation they'd almost certainly fold in days; likewise the level of arial surveillance by NATO, UK and US planes (and that's just the stuff we can see) that went on in Jan and Feb 2022 is hard to understand if their was a solid expectation of failure.

But assessments reached by the military forces, the intelligence agencies and the politicians don't all seem to have been in agreement, and it is the politicians who had to sign off on the export of the more potent weapons; it's not just about expectations re: Ukraine but the boundary pushing as to what level of support the Russians would accept as well as some ungrounded exceptionalism over how long it would take to train the Ukrainian forces on some weapons systems (still such quotes coming out from some quarters).

Will be interesting to see what's written about all this by future historians.  

In reply to wintertree:

Yes and no.

Spending time training people is a long term investment. If the attack happens before that long term then its wasted eg what if Russia had invaded early 2015?

It is something which would be hoped for but until a bunch of classified documents get released in 30 or so years time we wont know how much those really knowledgeable actually thought about the odds.

For the aerial surveillance I dont think that says much either way. Outside of an insane escalation from Russia of shooting them down it was really a win win for the west either way. They could get a look at the jamming capabilities and start figuring out how to counter them. Whilst the Russians would get some insight into the capability I think it could have been managed in a way to limit it.

For the length of time to train people I dont think it is exceptionalism. A lot of the training cost is in the maintenance and support of the weapons. Plus there is the hidden training cost of getting someone up to speed. You might be able to train the gunner in x months but the NCO in charge will have had that x months training as a gunner plus y years experience and then z months additional training.

In reply to mondite:

I think there is a good case for some of this.

A comment repeated by various military trainers from NATO nations working with Ukrainian troops is that they've been surprised by the single minded focus on learning, their commitment and the speed with which they're picking things up.  Their forces have become one of the most actual combat experienced forces on the planet in the last 6 months.  Quote after quote from various nations has been about e.g. how long it takes to train a new pilot to the point they can fly aircraft X, but the task here is not training a new pilot or tank crew, but taking one with extensive combat experience in a high performance jet or a modern (sh!) tank and type-converting them.

The recent dribs and drabs about the integration of the HARM missiles into Ukrainian jets shows how quickly they can adapt to and use modern western weapons systems. 

Agreed.

Their NCOs have the experience of every part of the job except of the specifics of the western weapons systems.  Ukraine has had no obvious problems deploying any of the modern systems donated/loaned/sold to them.  One does of course wonder if some of the foreign legion over there might be there in other capacities, record of which is not likely to be kept.

In reply to wintertree:

How did that go for Afghanistan...?

On the other hand, it probably helps if your trainees aren't stoned most of the time, and not just taking part to get paid, or ambivalent towards the opposition.

In reply to captain paranoia:

I take your point, but I suggest it’s flipped and agrees with what I said - I don’t the the UK expected Afghanistan to fold like it did; seems clear we weren’t prepared for it to turn like it did.  

So many big differences - internal vs external enemy, western forces on the ground taking the lead vs being strictly limited to training and kit supply - that barely scratches the surface.

Edit to your edit:

Quite. The Ukrainians have a very clear idea of what they are fighting for, and of what they are fighting to prevent.  They have a lot more quality of life to loose compared to those in some other conflicts.

In reply to Bojo:

The US will not allow Russia to win this one. 

In reply to mondite:

Your mention of the Norse is a good reminder that Rurik (a Norse chief) ruled Novgorod (the northernmost Rus principality) and his successors went onto take over Kiev and from there rule much of the Rus lands, before they broke up into feudal fiefdoms. This was  3 centuries before Moscow was founded. Later on, the Moscow princes (themselves descended from Rurik) went on to ‘collect’ (aka conquer) the Rus lands. However modern day Ukraine didn’t come within Moscow’s orbit until well after most of modern day Russia this side of the Urals (perhaps this is why Ukraina is derived from ‘on the edge’). Perhaps Putin should pay homage to the Norwegians?

As for what he might do, I’m not sure anyone knows, even he himself. I wouldn’t necessarily credit the guy with having a coherent game plan. I don’t think a tactical nuclear strike could be ruled out unfortunately, if he feels he’s got nothing to loose. However I’m not sure what he would gain either. It’s not like he can wipe out the entire Ukrainian army in one hit or even several hits and even less so without killing a load of his own troops; whilst a strike on Kiev would deprive him of the jewel in the crown and may be hard to justify at home. Of course he might not care much beyond a certain point.

It’s also not clear what the rest of the world could really do about it, apart from more sanctions and perhaps cyberattacks etc. I wonder whether the US would be capable of a (deniable) assassination - probably not. China’s position might be key and I can’t imagine Xi would be keen on a nuclear escalation. So on balance I’d say it’s possible but not likely.

Does that mean the West and Ukrainian should give in? Of course not. We have seen what Russian occupation means for the Ukrainians and he would be emboldened to go further. Latvia and Estonia would be next and they are in NATO, so we would actually end up with WWIII.  

There is still the possibility of a coup if the siloviki (army and security services henchmen) feel that he is going to move against them by scapegoating them. Again, possible but not likely.

May you live in interesting times…

In reply to Bojo:

Doubt the Ukrainian are that frightened of the semi mobilisation of 300,000 . Taxi drivers and farmers, to join up with the rapists and murderers already press ganged into joining from the local prisons. They will get very basic training and terrible kit to be fed into Putins meat grinder at the front line. They know this so will spend most of the time drunk on vodka to give them the courage to do as they are told until they are out of sight, at which point most will surrender or run.

The Ukrainians already have 700,000 soldiers all highly motivated defending their own land with Zelensky looking to grow the number to 1 million by year end. 

In reply to Bjartur i Sumarhus:

Reports that anti-mobilisation protestors are being arrested and… mobilised.

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/22/europe/russia-protests-partial-mobilizat...

There is no way this ends well.  I hope the west is ready for what becomes of Russia one way or another.

In reply to wintertree:

Shoigu said only those with recent combat experience would be mobilised but the actual decree doesn’t limit the mobilisation pool in this way. There are only limited exemptions, eg medical or being in prison (but Wagner can sweep up the inmates separately…). Shoigu also mentioned there will be top up training but again this is not what might happen in practice. 

In reply to Bojo:

Here’s ISW’s take on the nuclear threat. They are pretty sceptical regarding the likely impact of the mobilisation as well. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-as...

Putin framed his comments about the possibility of Russian nuclear weapons use in the context of supposed Western threats to use nuclear weapons against Russia. He claimed that Western officials were talking about “the possibility and permissibility of using weapons of mass destruction—nuclear weapons—against Russia.” He continued, “I wish to remind those who allow themselves such statements about Russia that our country also has various means of attack...”  His comment on this topic concludes by noting that Russia would use all means at its disposal in response to a threat to “the territorial integrity of our country, for the defense of Russia and our people.” That comment could be interpreted as applying in advance to the soon-to-be annexed areas of occupied Ukraine, but its placement in the speech and context do not by any means make such an interpretation obvious. Nor is Putin’s language in making this comment different from formal Kremlin policy or from previous statements by Russian officials. Putin’s speech should not be read as an explicit threat that Russia would use nuclear weapons against Ukraine if Ukraine continues counter-offensives against occupied territories after annexation.

In reply to wintertree:

Not hard to imagine how combat effective an anti mobilisation protester will be. I can't see any other outcome than Putins downfall and Ukraine victory. 

A global nuclear war obliterates Russia. A local nuclear war leaves swathes of Russia and Ukraine uninhabitable for millenia and alienates pro Putin supporters in Russia and Ukraine (Also China and India). Mobilisation puts the children of Moscow and St Petersburg middle class in the line of fire and will not change the course of the conventional war, due to the massive short comings of the Russian military. Putin knows this and must be bluffing, otherwise he is completely insane and the Russians will deal with him themselves. Either way, the West has to stay firm strong and fully back Ukraine. 

"I hope the west is ready for what becomes of Russia one way or another."

Putins ideological obsession has brought about NATO expansion, the loss of their biggest commodity customer, the accelerated development of non fossil fuel energy tech, the live fire test in combat situations of NATO's latest advanced weaponry, the loss of Western investment and collaboration, plus the loss of all spare parts for 95% of their civilian aircraft fleet plus cars/lorries and farm equipment. Therefore it would be surprising to me if the next leader followed the same path as Putin. I reckon reasonable chance the Russians will want a change of direction (fingers crossed)

In reply to Misha:

The Ukranians have already attacked Crimea on numerous occasions. No nukes came back at them. So " in response to a threat to “the territorial integrity of our country, for the defense of Russia and our people.” is just another bluff. 

In reply to wintertree:

The relatively feeble street protest movement doesn't threaten the Putin regime in any way, and the new threat of being drafted if you're arrested at a protest will effectively kill off the latest stirrings, I think.

The fact that tens of thousands of demoralised, defeated, under-equipped - but armed - contract soldiers in Ukraine whose war contracts were ending are now being told those contracts have been indefinitely renewed though, seems more of a volatile situation. Especially when many of their senior officers are inept and corrupt and have been flogging off the equipment to build their dachas for years. Even so, I'd guess mass desertions and 'fragging' incidents would be more likely than open mutiny.

In reply to Bjartur i Sumarhus:

Strictly speaking, I'm not sure that's true.  An undesirable neighbourhood for humans for many years, possibly more than 100, certainly; uninhabitable for thousands of years, no.

T.

In reply to Bojo:

Serious question: What consequences?

Tighter, longer lasting sanctions?  More global economic and food insecurity? An escalation of the flow of money and weapons into what remained of Ukraine, assuming enough command capability remained to make use of it? The risk of contaminating Russian people or territory? Reduced support/non-criticism from Asian powers?

It's worth remembering there have been 1000's of nuclear detonations in and on earth since the first in '45, most of us have lived our whole lives in that contamination. A small scale deployment, while undoubtedly bad, wouldn't necessarily have much direct impact outside of the targeted region. These things rightly became taboo with the advent of MAD but it wasn't always thus, through the 50s and 60s we blew them up willy nilly all over the place. For example of how lightly  they were treated the UK government seriously considered a plan to nuke the North York Moors rather than using conventional damming techniques!

jk

In reply to Tony Buckley:

You are right to pull me up on that, I stand corrected. A nuclear bomb gives off far less radiation than a melting nuclear reactor. Hence the reason Hiroshima and Nagasaki were rebuilt years later yet Chernobyl and Fukishima are still extremely problematic to this day. Should Zaporizhzhia (or any other reactor) be destroyed then the point I made above still stands (with millennia downgraded to a century or so) 

In reply to Billhook:

Prevailing winds in parts of Ukraine are often easterlies.

http://wdc.org.ua/atlas/en/4080100.html#:~:text=In%20the%20north%2C%20east%....

In reply to jkarran:

except modern nukes are much more powerful than the ones used in anger 70 years ago. The Hiroshima bomb was 15kt. Modern bombs are in the region of up to 300-500kt. To put that all into perspective, the Beirut explosion in 2020 was estimated at 2.7kt

youtube.com/watch?v=LNDhIGR-83w& 

Anyway, I think we all agree any nuclear device regardless of size will be an escalation nobody wants

In reply to Tony Buckley:

These conversations must be taking place through high windows or at the top of stairwells, and the subject must be making them dizzy - have you seen how many of them are falling (out of windows etc.).

In reply to Dr.S at work:

Actually anyone who invaded toward Russia first went through Ukraine/Belarus - it's those countries that have suffered first (and most), not Russia. It's also those countries where armies have been slaughtered.

In reply to Bjartur i Sumarhus:

Some are, some aren't. I know how big these things got but nobody is seriously suggesting the Russians might use their strategic nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Even the act of launching them could be civilisation ending, they certainly couldn't be anything like confident it wouldn't be misinterpreted!

Hard to see though why we won't eventually end up there with Putin out of options unless he is internally deposed and brutally scapegoated for Russia's losses before that. Also hard to see though what a limited strike might actually achieve so long as Ukrainian forces remain dispersed with their command and control systems bunkered.

jk

In reply to jkarran:

"Also hard to see though what a limited strike might actually achieve so long as Ukrainian forces remain dispersed with their command and control systems bunkered."

I mentioned further up thread...Putin using a tactical nuke makes no strategic sense other than hoping everyone would be so shocked we all back off and give him what he wants. He must know that will not happen right?

In reply to Bjartur i Sumarhus:

I can only imagine what effect the use of a 'small' tactical nuke being used on Ukrainian soil would be.  My bet is that the Russians would find the Ukrainians had been going easy on them until then. 

In reply to jkarran:

I tend to agree. Stuff like the Tsar Bomb was all part of the MAD doctrine where anyone launching a nuclear strike knew the other side would launch a massive counter strike, obliterating each others' population centres.

This is completely different. Modern tactical nukes can be tuned for yield, blast radius, the level of radiation emitted etc. Neutron bombs were specifically designed for use against armoured formations without rendering the battlefield uninhabitable.

I wish I shared the certainty that Putin won't use tactical nuclear weapons against the Ukraine.

In reply to Bjartur i Sumarhus:

I don't know. Destruction of a smaller city as a show of capability coupled with a threat of further strikes would be a powerful lever. Hard to see his bluff being called once he'd demonstrated willingness. Then what, it's Ukrainian capitulation or immediate extension of something like article 5 cover from NATO or a credibly capable member to shield Kyiv. Unlikely.

It worked with Japan, nobody has been willing to repeat it since but if anyone might currently Putin seems top of the list given his predicament. It wouldn't win a peace but it might just end a war he has no other obvious way out of alive.

jk

In reply to jkarran:

tactical nukes are not for city destruction normally. 

However it would not be "Russia that done it" but "Nato or the Ukraine" on Russian TV

In reply to wercat:

Whatever they were designed for 'normally', a 10kT air burst over a small city would do a lot of material damage! What was left standing would be open to the weather, unserviced and practically uninhabitable. Those who survived and could would leave rendering the place economically inactive. That's 'destroyed' in my book.

jk

In reply to Bjartur i Sumarhus:

You are referring to strategic nuclear weapons. But tactical (i.e. battleground) nuclear weapons can have much smaller yields - believed to be as low as 0.3 kiloton. (See e.g. https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/tactical-nuclear-weapons)

Edit: the USA's W48 nuclear artillery shell apparently had a yield of 0.072 kilotons! (See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W48) An amazing bit of engineering.

In reply to jkarran:

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/05/how-nato-could-strike-back-if-putin-use...

An opinion piece that considers a non nuclear response

In reply to Rob Parsons:

The W54 warhead used in the Davy Crockett was nuts. At least the artillery shell could be lobbed to a decent distance.

In reply to Bojo:

Who knows... Beyond Putin's inner circle?

He's publicly played the role of "mad and unpredictable" to intimate people but the problem is that it's increasingly hard to see where the acting stops and the actual lunatic starts. He publicly said on many occasions that if there is no Russia in the world what's the purpose of having a world?

And then there's the unsubstantiated rumours that he is terminally ill (although on a longer timescale), so if he wants to achieve his life work (essentially turning back the clock to USSR) he has to act. He said in the Russian revolution they took a country of peasants and created an industrial giant in only a few years. And Gorbachev did exactly the same thing... but in reverse.

He can't delay and has to make his stand, as he sees it... It's all a perfect storm. Very worrying. If only he could choke on a sandwich or something, the world would be in less danger.

In reply to Ridge:

Everyone seems very focused on nuclear weapons in the discussions here.  There are other kinds of weapons that have apparently been used by allies of Putin in Syria, for example, and in apparently Russian organised attacks on individuals within NATO borders.  It seems like the barrier to deploying chemical weapons may be significantly lower for the Russians than fission or fusion devices.   

In reply to wintertree:

Chlorine, just for example... can be flatly denied, blamed on industrial accident, blamed on the other side, doesn't leave much persisting evidence. Used a lot in Syria and harder to dispute there, accusations of small scale use in Ukraine but no smoking gun and disputable

Nuclear? Pretty clear what it was and carte-blanche for escalation. 

There's a whole different ante in terms of escalation between those two example

Unless you mean the new kids? (novichok) then that has "only" been used against very specific targets for very specific reasons. It was a very international and murky affair. Completely abhorrent but again a low risk of escalation

In reply to wintertree:

Their usefulness on a modern battlefield is debatable.

Long essay here.

https://acoup.blog/2020/03/20/collections-why-dont-we-use-chemical-weapons-...

To sum it up unless you are wanting to attack heavily entrenched troops then generally a HE shell does a better job of upsetting your opponents day vs a gas shell.

In reply to mondite:

We don't just have a modern battlefield, we have systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure with no regards to (or deliberate intent against) civilian life.  

Thermite incendiary munitions are claimed to be getting used against residential areas, e.g.:

https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1572344831606951940

Once they commit to indiscriminate warfare against civilians, the escalation to chemicals seems a lot lower to me than to nuclear.  The US did take unilateral action (1) against Syria after they reportedly used chlorine and potentially sarin in attacks mind.

(1) It sounds like the UK tried to take part but had its submarines chased off by the Russians.  

In reply to mondite

chemical weapons against a peer is normally seen as a way of shifting the tempo down several  gears if things aren't going the [soviet] way in a particular area as everything takes far longer to do and is less comfortable, more fatiguing

In reply to kmsands:

It might dampen protests by men but inflame protests by their mothers, partners and sisters. Women can’t be mobilised as far as I know. Worth bearing in mind that the February 2017 revolution which deposed the Tsar started from women protesting against bread queues.

Latest rumour that they’re actually going for 1m rather than 300k, which is even crazier. 

In reply to Misha:

If only...