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Careful out there folks! me and a partner were climbing in Sneachda yesterday and whilst descending the Goat Track triggered an avalanche. Luckily I was attached to the belay but my partner got knocked off stance and was swept to the bottom sustaining poss broken collar bone, hand and knee injury. Able to walk out. Be wary, stay safe with all that snow about.
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In reply to Frazer:
The observations and forecast at the time being here: http://www.sais.gov.uk/northern-cairngorms/
The observations and forecast at the time being here: http://www.sais.gov.uk/northern-cairngorms/
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In reply to Frazer:
If you've not already reported it might be worth doing?
http://www.sais.gov.uk/report_avalanche/
If you've not already reported it might be worth doing?
http://www.sais.gov.uk/report_avalanche/
In reply to george mc:
Its OK I have reported it.
Only a broken hand in the end, shoulder, knee and hip are petty tender. I got airborne over a couple of cliffs on the way down, probably saved me from being buried. I thought I was going to die all the time and am amazed to have got away from it at all.
We approached a dodgy looking patch of snow, so I made an anchor and tied Frazer onto it so he could cross. I thought I was to the side and out of danger so didnt actually tie on myself. Big mistake, when Frazer crossed, the slope went, and something knocked me off my perch and I got swept down.
I would like to say a massive thinks to Tim and Tamsin who helped carry my gear down and sorted out the mountain rescue, and the other lads who caught us up and and helped break trail and make a safe path, and the mountain rescue for coming to get me, and to Jonny and Frazer for sorting my car and gear out.
Its OK I have reported it.
Only a broken hand in the end, shoulder, knee and hip are petty tender. I got airborne over a couple of cliffs on the way down, probably saved me from being buried. I thought I was going to die all the time and am amazed to have got away from it at all.
We approached a dodgy looking patch of snow, so I made an anchor and tied Frazer onto it so he could cross. I thought I was to the side and out of danger so didnt actually tie on myself. Big mistake, when Frazer crossed, the slope went, and something knocked me off my perch and I got swept down.
I would like to say a massive thinks to Tim and Tamsin who helped carry my gear down and sorted out the mountain rescue, and the other lads who caught us up and and helped break trail and make a safe path, and the mountain rescue for coming to get me, and to Jonny and Frazer for sorting my car and gear out.
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In reply to Phil Ingle:
Lucky man Least you are in one - slightly battered piece - though to tell the tale. Here's to a quick and full recovery.
Lucky man Least you are in one - slightly battered piece - though to tell the tale. Here's to a quick and full recovery.
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In reply to Frazer:
Not sure what's more dangerous, descending a well known avalanche spot in poor conditions or posting that you did so on here! either way, hope you don't get too flamed and here's to a speedy recovery.
Not sure what's more dangerous, descending a well known avalanche spot in poor conditions or posting that you did so on here! either way, hope you don't get too flamed and here's to a speedy recovery.
Again, I am genuinely interested in your reasoning on the day for descending the goat track in loading conditions? even more so when your gut instinct told you the snow was dodgy? Surely you could have chosen a better way down?
https://ukc2.com/i/130093.jpg
https://ukc2.com/i/130093.jpg
In reply to Milesy:
Come on, man! Go easy on him. We've all made errors of judgment in climbing, haven't we?
Come on, man! Go easy on him. We've all made errors of judgment in climbing, haven't we?
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In reply to nickinscottishmountains:
Not having a go at the OP as I don't know the circumstances and have seen avalanche forecasts change with conditions and be used unfairly to accuse folk of incompetance. However its obvious from those who climb regularly near the honeypots that way too many folk don't understand the first thing about avalanche risk from times when the forecast was genuinely bad for certain slope aspects early that day and was plain ignored. Avalanches kill and dont discriminate in favour of the safety of rescuers. Descending a known loaded slope is incredibly irresponsible.
Not having a go at the OP as I don't know the circumstances and have seen avalanche forecasts change with conditions and be used unfairly to accuse folk of incompetance. However its obvious from those who climb regularly near the honeypots that way too many folk don't understand the first thing about avalanche risk from times when the forecast was genuinely bad for certain slope aspects early that day and was plain ignored. Avalanches kill and dont discriminate in favour of the safety of rescuers. Descending a known loaded slope is incredibly irresponsible.
In reply to nickinscottishmountains:
I think he is going easy. Its an interesting question. It helps us all to consider the thought processes and actions which ultimately lead to a situation like this developing. Opportunity for learning and all that.
I think he is going easy. Its an interesting question. It helps us all to consider the thought processes and actions which ultimately lead to a situation like this developing. Opportunity for learning and all that.
In reply to Milesy:
Reasoning was that the majority of the descent was stripped of snow by the wind, there were isolated patches of loaded snow which could be avoided.
We followed a heathery and rocky line down. But got trapped between two depressions loaded with snow. The one to the left was about 10m wide, to the right it was only about 5m wide. There was a good rock to belay from so I thought a secured crossing of 5m of unstable snow a better option than going back up and down the other side.
After crossing the 5m of unstable snow there was another rocky and heathery rib that could have been safely followed down. Which Frazer did in fact follow down safely afterwards.
The only error I made was thinking I was out of harms way, so not bothering to tie in myself in while Frazer went safely across.
It is not as if the whole gully was loaded. It was not a poor decision to descend that way. In fact a BMG guide and a trainee guide came down the same way shortly after us without roping up. I am sure if it was a "crazy" idea to head down that way they would have found a different descent route.
I hope that helps you with your understanding.
My reasoning for not tying in was a time saving one. I though that while Frazer looked for a boulder to belay from on the other side I could de-rig my belay and find my end of the rope and tie in, so saving a bit of time. I was stood to the side of the snow patch on a solid boulder, I felt 'safe'. I have learnt from this to spend a bit more time assessing how 'safe' my position is in future.
Reasoning was that the majority of the descent was stripped of snow by the wind, there were isolated patches of loaded snow which could be avoided.
We followed a heathery and rocky line down. But got trapped between two depressions loaded with snow. The one to the left was about 10m wide, to the right it was only about 5m wide. There was a good rock to belay from so I thought a secured crossing of 5m of unstable snow a better option than going back up and down the other side.
After crossing the 5m of unstable snow there was another rocky and heathery rib that could have been safely followed down. Which Frazer did in fact follow down safely afterwards.
The only error I made was thinking I was out of harms way, so not bothering to tie in myself in while Frazer went safely across.
It is not as if the whole gully was loaded. It was not a poor decision to descend that way. In fact a BMG guide and a trainee guide came down the same way shortly after us without roping up. I am sure if it was a "crazy" idea to head down that way they would have found a different descent route.
I hope that helps you with your understanding.
My reasoning for not tying in was a time saving one. I though that while Frazer looked for a boulder to belay from on the other side I could de-rig my belay and find my end of the rope and tie in, so saving a bit of time. I was stood to the side of the snow patch on a solid boulder, I felt 'safe'. I have learnt from this to spend a bit more time assessing how 'safe' my position is in future.
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In reply to gavmac:
Completely agree, but the tone of question (whether intended or not) is very important. Supportive questions are far more beneficial than blunt/direct questions like "Surely you could have chosen a better way down."
It sounds like everyone was more or less ok in the end. Perhaps one of them will write up a brief summary and post it on here, for the benefit of anyone that wants to read it. I'd understand if they chose not to though!
Edit - Beaten to it, Phil was writing as I was. Thanks Phil!
Completely agree, but the tone of question (whether intended or not) is very important. Supportive questions are far more beneficial than blunt/direct questions like "Surely you could have chosen a better way down."
It sounds like everyone was more or less ok in the end. Perhaps one of them will write up a brief summary and post it on here, for the benefit of anyone that wants to read it. I'd understand if they chose not to though!
Edit - Beaten to it, Phil was writing as I was. Thanks Phil!
Post edited at 15:10
In reply to Frazer:
I must admit to asking myself the same question, why, when I first read your thread. That slope is notorious as we know, due to its convex nature, and being so prone to cross-loading. Match that to the forecast, and my gut reaction would be to stay away.
However, when I read your profile, (as we so often do), I then asked myself again why an experienced mountaineer would have done so, and concluded it couldn't have been cut and dried idiocy. Your description of the route matches what I saw last weekend and the one before that, scoured patches and areas of loading, and you felt, (as did the BMG et al) that is was doable.
So what I am concluding personally, in the interest of learning (which I do believe is very valid, so well done for 'fessing, as the kids would say, and giving us the opportunity to do this), is that the areas of instability noted in the SAIS are just that, areas. I for one preferred the 'cherry toms' rather than the lines on SAIS, as they sort of better represented 'areas', and I said so on the feedback section of the site. I just think it focusses the attention better.
I recall the report from Chris Walker's death on the Buachaille, when a 'mattress-sized' avalanche swept him and a client away.
Conclusion, and re-enforced learning - It doesn't have to be a heavily loaded slope, and even with 'islands of safety', we MUST be very careful when we know loading had occurred, even on seemingly small innocuous looking patches.
Yes?
I must admit to asking myself the same question, why, when I first read your thread. That slope is notorious as we know, due to its convex nature, and being so prone to cross-loading. Match that to the forecast, and my gut reaction would be to stay away.
However, when I read your profile, (as we so often do), I then asked myself again why an experienced mountaineer would have done so, and concluded it couldn't have been cut and dried idiocy. Your description of the route matches what I saw last weekend and the one before that, scoured patches and areas of loading, and you felt, (as did the BMG et al) that is was doable.
So what I am concluding personally, in the interest of learning (which I do believe is very valid, so well done for 'fessing, as the kids would say, and giving us the opportunity to do this), is that the areas of instability noted in the SAIS are just that, areas. I for one preferred the 'cherry toms' rather than the lines on SAIS, as they sort of better represented 'areas', and I said so on the feedback section of the site. I just think it focusses the attention better.
I recall the report from Chris Walker's death on the Buachaille, when a 'mattress-sized' avalanche swept him and a client away.
Conclusion, and re-enforced learning - It doesn't have to be a heavily loaded slope, and even with 'islands of safety', we MUST be very careful when we know loading had occurred, even on seemingly small innocuous looking patches.
Yes?
Post edited at 16:20
In reply to JohnnyW:
Yes.
Windslab can be a very localised feature. We had an fatality in NZ a couple of winters ago when a climber was knocked off his feet above a large drop after triggering an area of windslab that had a footprint about the size of a car and was maybe 20 cm deep. In another place a small area of slab could be completely innocuous.
Some questions to run through if you're contemplating crossing a slope:
1. Could it avalanche? (is it steep enough, is there enough snow?)
2. How stable is the snowpack? (Your own field observations & forecast information.)
3. If you're on the slope and it goes, what are the consequences? (Where will I be swept to - in a crevasse, over a bluff, into a lake?) The consequences might be negligible in which case jumping on it will give you valuable information.
4. How will conditions change in the future? (You might need to cross this slope later in the day when it's more loaded / warmer etc.)
To Frazer & Phil - thanks for sharing details of your experience here - there's always plenty to learn from these incidents and it's good to see the willingness to provide that chance to the rest of us.
One other thing for what it's worth on the point Phil raised about feeling "safe" just before being avalanched. Avalanches are not like 80 m vertical drops or long run-outs - they don't make us feel scared until they happen. Expressing surprise at being caught is a regular thing that avalanche victims do after the event. It's worth reflecting on risk management in avalanche terrain in that light. Without wanting to sound paranoid, it's a situation where thinking "what's the worst that could happen?" and then dealing with that hazard is not a bad approach.
Yes.
Windslab can be a very localised feature. We had an fatality in NZ a couple of winters ago when a climber was knocked off his feet above a large drop after triggering an area of windslab that had a footprint about the size of a car and was maybe 20 cm deep. In another place a small area of slab could be completely innocuous.
Some questions to run through if you're contemplating crossing a slope:
1. Could it avalanche? (is it steep enough, is there enough snow?)
2. How stable is the snowpack? (Your own field observations & forecast information.)
3. If you're on the slope and it goes, what are the consequences? (Where will I be swept to - in a crevasse, over a bluff, into a lake?) The consequences might be negligible in which case jumping on it will give you valuable information.
4. How will conditions change in the future? (You might need to cross this slope later in the day when it's more loaded / warmer etc.)
To Frazer & Phil - thanks for sharing details of your experience here - there's always plenty to learn from these incidents and it's good to see the willingness to provide that chance to the rest of us.
One other thing for what it's worth on the point Phil raised about feeling "safe" just before being avalanched. Avalanches are not like 80 m vertical drops or long run-outs - they don't make us feel scared until they happen. Expressing surprise at being caught is a regular thing that avalanche victims do after the event. It's worth reflecting on risk management in avalanche terrain in that light. Without wanting to sound paranoid, it's a situation where thinking "what's the worst that could happen?" and then dealing with that hazard is not a bad approach.
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In reply to nickinscottishmountains:
I was going easy. I asked a genuine question as we can all potentially learn from the mistake.
> Come on, man! Go easy on him. We've all made errors of judgment in climbing, haven't we?
I was going easy. I asked a genuine question as we can all potentially learn from the mistake.
In reply to Phil Ingle:
Phil, thank you for your insight and not taking it personally
> My reasoning for not tying in was a time saving one. I though that while Frazer looked for a boulder to belay from on the other side I could de-rig my belay and find my end of the rope and tie in, so saving a bit of time. I was stood to the side of the snow patch on a solid boulder, I felt 'safe'. I have learnt from this to spend a bit more time assessing how 'safe' my position is in future.
Phil, thank you for your insight and not taking it personally
In reply to Phil Ingle:
Reading the ground conditions and making your decision based on the observed hazard is a pretty sound approach.
However I think incorporating the presence of the BMG guide into the process is a classic heuristic trap - the 'expert halo'. The fact that a BMG guide was using the same descent route does not make it a safe choice. Better to trust to your own experience and judgement, or at least be aware of the decision trap.
> It is not as if the whole gully was loaded. It was not a poor decision to descend that way. In fact a BMG guide and a trainee guide came down the same way shortly after us without roping up. I am sure if it was a "crazy" idea to head down that way they would have found a different descent route.
Reading the ground conditions and making your decision based on the observed hazard is a pretty sound approach.
However I think incorporating the presence of the BMG guide into the process is a classic heuristic trap - the 'expert halo'. The fact that a BMG guide was using the same descent route does not make it a safe choice. Better to trust to your own experience and judgement, or at least be aware of the decision trap.
Post edited at 17:12
In reply to Frazer:
Thinking something may not avalanche and then it does, plus coming out ok has got to be a very valuable experience and hopefully enables you to look at conditions very wisely in the future, maybe better than most people in fact as few have done it. Really happy your ok(ish).
Thinking something may not avalanche and then it does, plus coming out ok has got to be a very valuable experience and hopefully enables you to look at conditions very wisely in the future, maybe better than most people in fact as few have done it. Really happy your ok(ish).
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In reply to planetmarshall:
Except that the Guide 'followed' the OP rather than the OP assuming that it was safe to follow a guide!
Except that the Guide 'followed' the OP rather than the OP assuming that it was safe to follow a guide!
In reply to Frazer:
As a relatively green winter climber, I very much appreciate your candid analysis! It's nice to see a mature discussion not descend into a lot of finger pointing, blaming and eye-rolling, and it helps educate the rest of us. Thanks.
As a relatively green winter climber, I very much appreciate your candid analysis! It's nice to see a mature discussion not descend into a lot of finger pointing, blaming and eye-rolling, and it helps educate the rest of us. Thanks.
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In reply to JohnnyW:
Not aiming this post at anyone in particular.
I see lots of folk writing things like "it's incredibly irresponsible to descend a knowing loaded slope" or something like that and "steep slopes that have wind blown snow on them should be avoided". Well, all the snow in Scotland is wind blown and "loaded"to some degree that changes on a metre by cm basis. I seem to see this every time I'm out and I'm on them. I know lots about snow and avalanches from both a practical and academic standpoint and with this knowledge I used to find that a(A). I would never go on a slope of more than 20deg or (B) I would be in a permanent state of slow burn terror.
The thing about avalanches is that you rarely get positive feedback about your decisions only negative and thus it is hard to tell which of the variables that you miss judged and I've just run off 12 independent variables by counting on my fingers that a person should take into account when making a decision about the snow - and then several of these will change in the next metre moved anyway, so it really is about how lucky you feel some times.
Thus i don't find too much value in an Internet accident analysis about avalanche accidents as really each situation is in other than very broad terms unique.
James e
Not aiming this post at anyone in particular.
I see lots of folk writing things like "it's incredibly irresponsible to descend a knowing loaded slope" or something like that and "steep slopes that have wind blown snow on them should be avoided". Well, all the snow in Scotland is wind blown and "loaded"to some degree that changes on a metre by cm basis. I seem to see this every time I'm out and I'm on them. I know lots about snow and avalanches from both a practical and academic standpoint and with this knowledge I used to find that a(A). I would never go on a slope of more than 20deg or (B) I would be in a permanent state of slow burn terror.
The thing about avalanches is that you rarely get positive feedback about your decisions only negative and thus it is hard to tell which of the variables that you miss judged and I've just run off 12 independent variables by counting on my fingers that a person should take into account when making a decision about the snow - and then several of these will change in the next metre moved anyway, so it really is about how lucky you feel some times.
Thus i don't find too much value in an Internet accident analysis about avalanche accidents as really each situation is in other than very broad terms unique.
James e
Post edited at 20:31
In reply to James Edwards:
How are winter conditions down there in Norfolk?
> I've just run off 12 independent variables by counting on my fingers
How are winter conditions down there in Norfolk?
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In reply to Phil Ingle:
Just Trying to learn here!
Can't say I fault your initial thinking on trying the the slope or your plans mitigating disaster for crossing the dogey area/
One thing that puzzles me, you say you were knocked off your perch. Was this from above, or do you think it could have been the tug on the rope with you holding on from when Frazer triggered the avalanche?
Just Trying to learn here!
Can't say I fault your initial thinking on trying the the slope or your plans mitigating disaster for crossing the dogey area/
One thing that puzzles me, you say you were knocked off your perch. Was this from above, or do you think it could have been the tug on the rope with you holding on from when Frazer triggered the avalanche?
In reply to Frazer:
Hi Frazer,
Can I ask which route you climbed? Did you leave your rucksacks in Coire bottom?
Hi Frazer,
Can I ask which route you climbed? Did you leave your rucksacks in Coire bottom?
In reply to pass and peak:
I am not 100% sure, but I think I was knocked off by the rope. I don't think that there was enough snow above for it to have been that. The majority of the descent gully had been totally blown out, and was rock and heather. There were just isolated small patches of loaded snow here and there, which could be avoided. The loading on the upper slopes looked very similar to in this photo http://bit.ly/1CyW0bn
Because it was only 5m to cross the patch of snow, and Frazer was not going to place any gear when crossing, I didn't actually belay him. To speed things up I just pulled out 5m of rope and tied it to the boulder and gave Frazer the end. Then as he was crossing I started pulling the rope through to get the other end for me to tie onto so he could make me safe to cross. So I was busy looking at the rope I was pulling through, then all of a sudden I was in the snow heading down hill.
In reply to Northsea,
We climbed Aladdin's Mirror Direct, we did leave our sacks at the Coire bottom.
> One thing that puzzles me, you say you were knocked off your perch. Was this from above, or do you think it could have been the tug on the rope with you holding on from when Frazer triggered the avalanche?
I am not 100% sure, but I think I was knocked off by the rope. I don't think that there was enough snow above for it to have been that. The majority of the descent gully had been totally blown out, and was rock and heather. There were just isolated small patches of loaded snow here and there, which could be avoided. The loading on the upper slopes looked very similar to in this photo http://bit.ly/1CyW0bn
Because it was only 5m to cross the patch of snow, and Frazer was not going to place any gear when crossing, I didn't actually belay him. To speed things up I just pulled out 5m of rope and tied it to the boulder and gave Frazer the end. Then as he was crossing I started pulling the rope through to get the other end for me to tie onto so he could make me safe to cross. So I was busy looking at the rope I was pulling through, then all of a sudden I was in the snow heading down hill.
In reply to Northsea,
We climbed Aladdin's Mirror Direct, we did leave our sacks at the Coire bottom.
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